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Agendas in Encountering Citizens in the Nigerian context 
Oga Steve Abah and Jenkeri Zakari Okwori:i 
Agaba is running berserk in the street, wielding a machete and prancing as if possessed. As he 
rants and raves, he seems oblivious of every one following him trying to stop him, to hear 
what the cause of his aggravations is. “I am going to kill someone today, in fact more than 
one! As many as will tell me that I do not come from this place! What does it take to come 
from this desert town after I have lived here for 30 years, and had twelve children here? If it is 
a football team they want I have produced it! So, what is it? I will truly kill someone!”  
 
When he finally comes to a stop he looks very weary, frustrated and defeated. As if it would help to talk, 
he narrates his problems. He has lived in Kano for 30 years, paid all his tax here and had all his 12 
children in this town. Three of the children have gained admission to the university and the State 
would not give them scholarship. “Do you know why? They are telling them that they do not come 
from Kano! Where do they come from, every one?” That is why I am going mad, and I am right to do 
so, do you hear!?” He calms down again, and in a very subdued voice asks, “Where do these children 




In this article, we examine the question of citizenship and the different ways in 
which this may determine rights and privileges in Nigeria. The simple, yet complex 
way in which this can be thrown into sharp relief is to ask the question, Who is a 
Nigerian citizen? How is this determined and defined by: a) law, b) other factors?  
Even when citizenship is defined by law or wrested by individuals/groups, it is 
important to interrogate how Nigerians perceive their own citizenship. Some of the 
factors to look at include location/space, ethnicity, gender and religion. On the basis 
of who they think they are and the ways in which they have interpreted their own 
belonging in the country, people outline what they expect their entitlements to be. 
How have these expectations been shaped, and do they change over time and space?  
 
The reality of the Nigerian situation is that although citizenship is constitutionally 
determined by both ancestry and by place of birth or sojourn (The Nigerian 
Constitution of 1999: p. A888), in practice Nigerians always revert to and insist on 
ancestry as the true and recognizable determinant of who you are and what you may 
be entitled to. What is in practice therefore in every day official and public spheres is 
in conflict with the provisions of law. This is playing itself out in the life of Agaba 
and other Nigerians in similar circumstances. The issues at stake are about how 
Agaba’s and any other Nigerian’s state of origin/ancestral home limits his 
entitlements and how that limitation transfers to his offsprings, even when such 
children no longer have any serious knowledge of or interaction with the State they 
come from constitutionally.  
 
How did the practices and perceptions of exclusion and non-citizenship expressed by 
Agaba, come about? The question of citizenship, the issues of entitlement and the 
way in which Nigeria has been governed and its natural wealth managed, have all 
been under constant scrutiny since independence in 1960. Indeed, some of these 
issues have resulted in a civil war in the country and ushered the military into 
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Nigeria’s political scene for over 20 years. Some of the vexed issues that beg answers 
today are traceable to the way in which Nigeria came into being. What is known as 
Nigeria today is a patchwork knitted together by a history of colonisation. There are 
three major ethnic groups and correspondingly, three power blocks in the country. 
These are Hausa/Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and the Igbo (the 'Wazobia' groups). It is the 
unification/merger of these different nationalities, plus a myriad of others, into one 
country that has remained both a point of interest and area of aggravation for the 
political practice in Nigeria.  
 
In the first republic from 1960 to 1966, the discussion of these incongruities were 
incoherent and poorly mediated, thereby resulting in a war; in the military era 
Nigerians were silenced by the gun. Therefore in this current democratic period, 
there is another opportunity to discuss the issues again. Indeed, the discussions have 
been going on already, either violently or ‘peacefully’ in legislative houses.  
 
Identity and citizenship 
 
What is citizenship, and how does it interact with how people construct their sense 
of identity? Isin and Wood argue that citizenship has been conceived as a status 
(legal, juridical) while identity is a socially-defined, relational concept that classifies 
and positions individuals (1999:19). They also go on to argue that while citizenship 
and identity are not the same, they are not antinomic either: 'There is a tension 
between the universal aspirations of citizenship and the particularlist claims of 
identity. Nevertheless, since citizenship has never been universal, it is more 
appropriate to interpret different formation of group identities as claims for 
recognition of citizenship rights' (ibid: 20). Perhaps Lister's (1997:197) call to 
reconstruct citizenship along pluralist lines, would be a useful step towards 
accommodating or understanding the kind of tensions between group identities and 
citizenship rights that are at play in Nigeria today.  
 
However, competing identities in Nigeria's multi-ethnic society make such a 
proposal for inclusive citizenship difficult to achieve. In a tally that exceeds 370 
ethnic groups, the Hausa, Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba predominate (Otite 1990). But 
while the others are lumped together as minorities, the sizes vary from a few 
hundred thousand to 2-3 million. In both North and South, it is possible to identify 
tiers of minorities, where the first tier refers to the centre and its politics, while the 
second pertains to the state and local council levels.  This tiered nature of majority 
and minority ethnic groups means that some of the national minorities are de facto 
majorities at the other levels.  Furthermore, similar fears of domination, and denial of 
self-determination at the centre, are played out at these other levels. Hence, the 
construction of a pan-Nigerian identity based on equality of citizens and a common 
political practice remains elusive. Political mobilisation, even by political parties, 
tends to remain within the realm of sectarian loyalties.  
 
The centrality of the power of the state and its layer of ruling classes have played a 
major role in strengthening such ethno-political identities. Military dictatorships 
centralised political power, and distributed resources in a command-style top-down 
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fashion. Recipients of benefits thus had to be in line with the government of the day, 
or in other words, 'the ethnicity of the president' (Mamdani, 1996:289). This implies 
that control of the central government is not only necessary but also expedient. The 
party at the centre will be well placed to effect changes and benefits to its followers 
especially when it is regionally and ethnically determined. This prevalence of 
sectarian over citizenship rights can be traced back to misguided decisions made by 
colonial authorities.  
 
The colonial construction of citizenship   
 
What is now known as Nigeria was in fact a deliberate colonial creation, which arose 
from merging the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria into the Colony of 
Nigeria in 1914 (Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1998). A combination of the activities of the 
Royal Niger Company and later  British colonial rule, wiped out or distorted existing 
cultural and political patterns. Prior to 1914, Nigeria was organised into 
protectorates, then colonies. In 1906, the colony of Lagos was merged with the 
protectorate of the Niger Coast to form the colony and protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria. This, together with the protectorate of Northern Nigeria, made up the 
Nigerian entity. Each of the protectorates “was a sprawling territory of separate 
ethnolinguistic groups, each with its own distinctive history, language, social 
custom, and beliefs. Nigeria is therefore a veritable mosaic of nationalities; it has 
within its borders several hundred ethnic groups with distinct languages and 
cultures” (Okehie-Offa, 1996:1). 
 
After the amalgamation, the colonial authorities proceeded to divide the country in 
such a way as to lay the foundation for the current structural and citizenship 
impasse. In 1939, the Southern provinces of the country were split in two, but the 
North was left intact. The North alone in size occupies about 74% of the entire 
landmass of the country and according to (contested) population counts, is home to 
more than half of the population. This lopsided division has consequences for the 
way elections are conducted and who occupies the central administration. “Since the 
electoral system adopted in the country was based on the principles of proportional 
representation and majority rule, Northern Nigeria had a competitive advantage 
over the Southern regions in Federal politics” (Okeke, 1992:18), giving the North 
domination in political and territorial terms over the divided Southern regions.  
 
Resistance to colonial authority was dealt with through co-optation or repression. 
The British transformed sections of local African elites into the principal colonised 
employees of colonial service. Sections that resisted were excluded or exterminated. 
In the context of colonial indirect rule, the 'native rulers' were symbols of the colonial 
state, with concomitant executive, legislative and judiciary powers. Where these 
leaders were recruited from inside the ethnic group, peasant resistance took class 
form against oppression and tyranny. Where they were recruited from outside the 
group, resistance assumed an ethnic or ethno-religious character:  
 
'The form of rule shaped the form of revolt against it. Indirect rule at once 
reinforced ethnically bound institutions of control from within. Ethnicity 
 4 
(tribalism) thus came to be simultaneously the form of colonial control over 
natives and the form of revolt against it. It defined the parameters of both the 
Native Authority in charge of the local apparatus and of resistance to it' 
(Mamdani, 1996:23). 
 
This is, to some extent, the genesis of the ethnic strife in Nigeria today. Further, the 
legacy of colonial 'divide and rule' has been compounded by subsequent decades of 
military rule which, unaccountable and repressive in nature, undermined democratic 
values and skewed political space. Military intervention in Nigeria especially  that 
which ousted civilian regimes, has been of the 'veto type' (Nnoli, 1983), which 
retraditionalises or retribalises political activities by restricting or even banishing 
popular participation, thus shifting allegiance from superordinate (macro) to 
subordinate (micro) units, from state to nation, from nation to ethnic groups, and 
from ethnic groups  to the extended family (Oyovbaire, 1985).  
 
Resistance to exclusion from decision-making during the colonial period took the 
form of a nationalist movement for independence and citizenship. By the mid-1940s, 
an anti-colonial nationalist movement had galvanised most of the radical elite and 
militant workers' organisations in the struggle. The British response was to ban these 
organisations or imprison their leaders, and to depict the struggle as a Southern 
Nigeria phenomenon, keeping the north at bay. However by 1950, an anti-colonialist 
nationalist party (NEPU) emerged in the north which began to win support away 
from the British. Repression was unleashed on NEPU, and members were arrested, 
deported or jailed. Such efforts of the anti-colonialist radical nationalists were moves 
towards establishing a future democratic society with an inclusive citizenship.  
 
Nationalist citizen mobilisation took place again in the 1980s, in resistance to the 
introduction of structural adjustment policies. This time, not only workers and 
students but citizens from broad strata of society were involved. The fast-growing 
military regime however, ignored protests and went ahead with the policies that 
exacerbated poverty, and drove people back to ethno-religious and communal 
struggles over resources. However, the colonial and the 1980s experience of citizen 
mobilisation are important historical expressions of citizenship as resistance to 
exclusion. 
 
Citizenship and exclusion in contemporary Nigeria 
 
As explained above, what is today Nigeria was cobbled together by fiat, when the 
Northern and Southern Protectorates were merged in 1914. The nature of citizenship 
has remained controversial ever since, and is a constant national project that cannot 
be taken for granted. We here refer to citizenship as the legal rights of people who, 
by descent or naturalisation, have rights, privileges and obligations with reference to 
a nation, irrespective of sex, religion, ethnic or other affiliation. Inclusive citizenship refers 
to the extent to which all people can claim rights and whether  the rights claimed are 
equal for all people (DFID, 2000:7). The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Chapter II, 
Section 17, 2) states that: 'every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and 
opportunities before the law'. However, despite such constitutional provisions and 
 5 
those of international agreements such as CEDAWiii, the concept of inclusive 
citizenship in Nigeria appears to be a mirage. While theoretically, citizens as defined 
by the constitution, are granted the right to equal treatment, political participation 
and benefits in every day life, the practice has always been different. The 
discrimination, marginalisation, power domination, class divisions and  exclusion 
that characterise Nigeria’s political processes, though lacking constitutional backing, 
continue to wax stronger. 
 
Why does this happen? Earlier in this article, we mapped the ethnic landscape that is 
Nigeria. It will be useful to now look at the ways in which this landscape plays out in 
everyday Nigerian life. In Nigeria, as in most developing countries, the centres of 
development are located in the urban centres which serve in most cases as the 
administrative and commercial as well as industrial capitals and headquarters.  Most 
of these urban areas are located in the ethnic majority enclaves of Kaduna, Kano or 
Enugu and Onitsha or Lagos and Ibadan. Since job opportunities are only located in 
these urban centres, the location of which reflects the dominance in the power 
equation of the ethnic majorities in the politics of the country, the minorities became 
migrant labourers to these urban centres. Here, severed from their relatives back 
home, discriminated against by the host ethnic group who at every opportunity 
draw attention to their status as “foreigners” trying to take the food away from the 
“sons of the soil”, the migrants have no option but to reach out to their kinship ties to 
dispel their insecurity.  
 
Perhaps the greatest threat to citizenship in Nigeria lies in the concept of foreigner. In 
Nigeria, whether you were born in a state or had lived and worked there all your life, 
as long as it is not your state of origin, you are still a stranger, a non-indigene who is 
not entitled to the status and benefits enjoyed by those who are “bona fide” owners 
of the state. Even when you have a job with the state, such a job is on a contract basis. 
The 'northernisation' policy defined in 1957 by the Public Service Commission of the 
Northern Region as a hiring system, illustrates this phenomenon vividly: “If a 
qualified northerner is available, he is given priority in recruitment; if no northerner 
is available, an expatriate may be recruited or a non-northerner on contract terms” 
(quoted in Nnoli, 1978:191).  It is only if the establishment is a Federal one that  
tenure appointment can be awarded but even then, the tendency nowadays is that 
the states insist that certain positions within the Federal establishments in their states 
be reserved exclusively for their people, even if there are better qualified Nigerians 
from other states desperate for the job. It is no wonder therefore that ethnic identity 
articulation becomes a matter of necessity in the cities and one that drives a very 
strong wedge between being a Nigerian and being a member of an ethnic group.  
  
Realising a more inclusive citizenship is further complicated by the manipulations of 
identity over Nigeria's changing social and political space. The issue of changing 
space and identity came to the fore after the series of state creation exercises during 
the military regimes. After each exercise, the definition of indigeneity changed such 
that some of those who had been fellow citizens effectively became excluded. For 
example, when Nasarawa State was carved out of Plateau State, the indigenes of the 
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new state were requested to leave within a short space of time. All of a sudden, the 
people who had been bona fide citizens of Plateau State were now strangers and no 
longer welcome in their offices. The ensuing acrimony over asset sharing continues 
today. These changing criteria for inclusion and identity further complicate the 
challenge of national unity. While Nigerians are encouraged to 'rally round the flag', 
the reality indicates that just who Nigerians are is uncertain. People who belong in 
one situation are regarded as foreigners in another.  
 
In effect, which of several identities becomes paramount depends on the issues, the 
relative power between the key contestants, and who among the contenders stands 
to win or lose. In contention, some valued resource is always at stake, such as 
opportunities for education, employment, or representation in decision making, and 
the struggle is to exclude others. The issue is who is doing the labelling and excluding 
of 'others', and who has the power to enforce such labels. The group on the receiving 
end on the other hand, is often able to overcome whatever differences they had, and 
act in unison. In this sense, the assailed group accepts the labels and uses these as a 
rallying point. This explains why ethnicity sometimes takes precedence over religion, 
and vice versa. 
 
Alternatively, finding themselves excluded on the grounds of identity, 
disenfranchised groups may choose an 'exit' option. This refers to a disengagement 
or retreat from the state by disaffected or marginalised segments of the citizenry and 
in the same vein, the creation of parallel social, cultural, economic and political 
systems that compete with state structures (Osaghae 1998). The reciprocal rights 
normally associated with state-citizen relations are absent. In the Nigerian case, 
various forms of exit are apparent, especially the creation of parallel and self-
governing economic structures and socio-cultural and juridical activities.  As a result 
of the failure of the state to provide security for the lives and properties of its 
citizens, the 1990s witnessed an upsurge in the creation of vigilante groups such as 
the `Bakassi Boys' in eastern parts of the country.  This group engages in security 
duties with the open support of the state as does the O'odua Peoples Congress 
which, despite its overt political programme, engages in police duties by meting out 
instant justice to suspected criminals. Thus the inability of the state to provide public 
goods and services, combined with the authoritarian style of military dictatorships, 
has further alienated the citizenry and made them turn to alternative sources of 
support such as fundamentalist religious movements, ethnic self-help unions, black 
market networks, secret cults or outright exile.  
 
But in addition to all these, there is the major factor of resource control and 
management. Perhaps the crisis and eruptions which jump to the fore all the time are 
fuelled by the fact that the places and peoples where resources such as oil originate, 
are separated from the usage and benefits of these resources in other locations. Oil 
accounts for 85 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings. It is therefore correct to say that 
this is the main resource and lifeline of the nation. However, the benefits accruing to 
the places where oil comes from are far less than those enjoyed by the ethnicities 
which control state power. 
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Has all this changed with the Third Republic, and the return to civilian rule? Recent 
research suggests that Nigerian people's perceptions of their rights as citizens are 
limited and negative. In discussions with men and women in Kaduna and Benue 
States, TFDC researchers noted that: ‘people always wrote themselves out by saying 
"Us! We don't count! It is government and the politicians that matter". Overall, the 
situation amounts to a sense of non-citizen on the part of the ordinary Nigerians. It is 
also a defeat of human agency when one witnesses the disarticulated manner their 
sense of being operates in a divide of "us" and "them"' (Abah, 2001). 
 
Methodologies for change 
 
We have seen how citizenship in Nigeria is constructed around identities that are 
exclusionary and competing, the legacy of the historical colonial construction of the 
Nigerian nation which created a power imbalance between the northern and 
Southern States. Furthermore, access to resources continues to depend on ethnic 
allegiances and ethno-political systems of patronage. In this context, how can people 
begin to perceive citizenship in more inclusive and participatory terms? The work of 
civil society groups such as Theatre For Development Centre (TFDC) begins to 
address this need. Through participatory research into the nature of the problems 
and the factors which determine citizenship in Nigeria, TFDC is exploring how 
people perceive their citizenship and how such perceptions influence and affect what 
they consider as their rights. Participants in the research put their knowledge in a 
‘basket’ for community members to learn from, access and deploy. Some of the 
approaches include Citizen Drama (an excerpt from which introduces this article), in 
which an itinerant person whose citizenship status is constantly in flux, is in search 
of belonging. In structuring the citizen drama, a storyteller should bring wisdom 
from the people into the performance. He may be the narrator as well as the citizen 
in search of a nation. He may be collapsing the past into the present, and without 
doubt, these age-old practices contain their philosophy of life. The combination of 
these strategies are raising critical questions such as: Are these philosophies 
challenged by the new development in the country? Are they no longer relevant, or 
has there been a case of refusing to acknowledge their applicability in the new 
situation?  
 
The research is about exploring new spaces for citizenship action that encourage 
mobilisation without fear of reprisal, and a new inclusive culture that respects 
people’s understanding and practices of citizenship, rights and positive ways of 
deploying them to good effect. Today, the issue of exclusion is an urgent one for 
many Nigerian citizens. If we recall Agaba's last question "Where do these children 
come from?", it demands an answer, not only from the State but from every Nigerian. 
Every Nigerian should examine the issue of exclusion, so that when the question is 
answered it is not Agaba alone that will find satisfaction; it is not him alone who may 
need to plan follow-up action. The answer to the questions raised by the drama 
cannot be answered within the drama. They lie outside the fiction of the drama, in 
people's real lives and actions.  
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Theatre provides space to test approaches and suggested options for dealing with 
these issues. In practice this works by intervention and interrogation; what Boal has 
called forum . The audience provides answers and suggested actions, which are 
incorporated into the action so that the analysis happens from within; so that 
suggested actions are tried out and the limitations of such suggested actions are 
discovered. The drama as it were will be re-written, expanded and perhaps dissolved 
in performance. The bystanders, the spectators who have switched from watching to 
doing the drama are the subjects and victims of the problem that Agaba has 
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